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Submission to the Identity and Passport Service Consultation about the Identity 
Cards Secondary Legislation 2008. 
London School of Economics and Political Science Identity Project 
23 February 2009 
About the LSE Identity Project 
1. The LSE Identity Project1 provides ongoing research and analysis into the UK 
Government’s proposals to introduce national biometric identity cards.  The main 
Identity Project report2 issued in June 2005 identified six key areas of concern 
with the government’s plans including their high–risk and likely high–cost, as 
well as technological and human rights concerns. 
2. Since the publication of the main report in June 2005, the Identity Project has 
produced a number of further reports and cross–party briefings for key debates 
in Parliament that helped shape key amendments to the legislation, including 
issues of cost reporting and compulsion.  Since the proposals became law in 
March 2006, the project has provided evidence for the Science and Technology 
Select Committee review of the use of scientific evidence by the Scheme, the 
Home Affairs Committee inquiry into ‚A surveillance society?‛ and the House of 
Lords Constitution Committee inquiry into ‚the impact of surveillance and data 
collection‛.  Members have also analysed information issued about the ongoing 
costs of the Scheme.  They have reviewed the Strategic Action Plan released in 
December 2006 and the implications of the Delivery Plan 2008 and responded to 
the Delivery Plan Consultation. 
3. Although initially focused on the UK proposals, the analysis presented by the 
Identity Project has also contributed to policy deliberations in related areas 
including Real ID in the US, the Australian Access Card and similar proposals 
for Canada. 
4. Members of the LSE Identity Project have published and submitted a number of 
academic articles, including pieces in The Information Society journal, the 
European Conference on Information Systems, the European Journal of 
Information Systems and Communications of the ACM.  A book on identity 
                                                 
1
 http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk 
2
 http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk/mainreport.pdf  
assurance policies will be published by Palgrave in 2009.  Additional papers are 
currently under review with other peer-reviewed academic journals. 
We welcome comments on the content of the statutory instruments and related operational 
processes outlined for the processing of applications and application checks in this chapter. 
5. The detailed (100+ page) document outlining the reasoning and detail of the 
proposed secondary legislation indicates just how unnecessarily complex the 
proposed Scheme has become.  A few simple examples will illustrate this point.  
Although the primary legislation is the Identity Cards Act, the secondary 
legislation talks about ‚ID cards‛ and identification cards (which are a logically 
distinct category of card).  Moreover, the definition of ‚ID cards‛ (the formal 
name for a card issued under Section 6 of the Identity Cards Act) is only given in 
a footnote in the consultation document, not in the secondary legislation itself.   
Indeed, in the Applications regulations, the term ‚identity card‛ is introduced as 
‚an identity card that is valid as a travel document for travel to the United 
Kingdom‛ (emphasis added) and refers, not to the UK identity card but rather to 
a card held by an applicant who claims to be an EEA national. 
6. A second set of problems arises from the relationship between cards and the 
ability to use (some variants of) the card for travel purposes (hence the detailed 
clarifications in the Prescribed Information and Period of Validity of Card 
Regulations). 
7. Detailed comments about the specific regulations follow below. 
We welcome comments on how we have defined “place of residence” and “principal place of 
residence” and in particular, how to ensure that the legislative provisions can accommodate 
those living transient lifestyles. 
8. We remain unconvinced that these issues have been properly addressed (despite 
the planning process for this card scheme having been ongoing for at least seven 
years).  There is also a concern that those living a transient lifestyle are still 
required to pay for their card using a credit card, debit card or cheque, all of 
which typically require the issuing authority (bank) to have some record of an 
address (and presumably income) for the individual. 
9. There is an additional concern that this will require the collection of payment 
details (credit card details / bank account details) of all those paying for cards.  
The privacy and data protection issues associated with this data collection are 
not considered in the legislation. 
We welcome comments on the content of the statutory instrument relating to the information 
to be held on the card and its validity period, including the decision not to include the 
NIRNo on the card.  However, the layout and information held on the card will need to 
comply with international travel document standards established by the ICAO. 
10. We welcome the decision not to hold the NIRNo on the card and hope that this 
decision remains in the actual secondary legislation that is published.  In 
particular, we would expect that if this decision is overturned as a result of the 
consultation process, the IPS clearly indicates such a policy reversal, so that 
Parliamentarians can take a fully informed view on the consequences.  The 
wording of the regulations might be developed to clearly state that the card 
number is a ‚card issue number‛ and not the NIRNo. 
11. It is unclear how this decision relates to issue number on the Foreign National 
Identity Card (which is also stored in the Machine Readable Zone on the card). 
12. We also note that a number of countries have considered a shorter validity 
period for the travel documents (typically five years), to allow for technology 
upgrades. 
We welcome comments on the requirements to notify changes outlined in these statutory 
instruments as well as the related operational processes described in this chapter. 
13. One of the examples given of notifying changes is a woman changing her name 
upon marriage.  If ever there was a case for joined up government, surely this is 
it.  Given that the marriage has to be officially authorised, it would make sense 
for a citizen-centric service to allow for this update to be automatically 
performed. 
14. There are numerous practical issues with the updating process as outlined in the 
consultation, regulations and code of practice which are outlined below. 
We welcome comments on the provisions outlined for those who have moved abroad from the 
UK to report a change to the details on their identity card. 
15. It is unclear how these provisions relate to the government’s previous decision 
not to issue identity cards for UK nationals living abroad (the case of those living 
in Spain is particularly relevant). 
We welcome comments on how we might best facilitate those who may need to act as a proxy 
for people who lack capacity, due to mental or physical impairment, to provide a notification. 
We welcome comments on how the Government might assist applicants understand and 
fulfil their requirements to notify the Secretary of State of changes and / or errors to their 
card or to report a card that has been lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed. 
16. Again, we find it astonishing that despite the slow development of the Scheme 
and the considerable expenditure already incurred that the government has no 
detailed proposals for these key aspects of the Scheme’s implementation. 
17. Detailed comments on the draft code of practice are given below. 
Consultations on question of consent 
18. Some members of the LSE Identity Project are members of the EnCoRe project 
(http://www.encore-project.info) that is supported by the IPS and is explicitly 
looking at mechanisms for ensuring consent and providing reliable means of 
revoking that consent. 
19. There is considerable ambiguity between the potential provision of information 
from the NIR (with or without consent) and the previously announced decision 
that only Yes/No responses will be provided when an identity is verified against 
the NIR.  Further clarification of the difference between verification and other 
data push activities is required. 
20. The questions under 4.57 do not appear to relate to specific secondary legislation 
21. It is unclear whether the provisions in Regulations 11/12 are likely to be affected 
by the provisions of the data sharing elements of the Coroners and Justice Bill. 
We welcome comments on the proposal to provide for the roll out of identity cards to different 
groups through commencement orders and on the draft designation order that would link the 
issue of identity cards to the issue of criminal conviction certificates for airside workers. 
22. The proposals, other than designation of specific documents, are rather vague.  
Moreover, if the current plans for Beacon Sites (such as the City of Manchester) 
are to proceed, it is unclear how commencement orders / designation of specific 
documents could possibly operate in such sites (especially for those with 
transient life styles). 
We welcome comments on the fee regulations that support the proposal for an initial fee of 
£30 for ID cards issued in 2009/10, subject to an evaluation phase at the Wave 1 airports, 
where the fee may be waived for airside workers who are required to enroll on the National 
Identity Register and are issued with an identity card. 
23. We believe that the fee is far too high for the cards to be successful.  There is no 
detail in the regulations about the waiving of fees for airside workers and we fear 
that those who are being compelled to enroll on the NIR may be expected to pay 
the £30 fee after all.  We note that there are no plans at this stage for verification 
fees to be set or the cost to industry of using various identity related services.  
This ambiguity will severely hamper the take up of the Scheme by the private 
sector. 
Specific comments on regulations 
Applications and issue of ID cards 
24. 3 (2) (b) Refers to applying ‚in person‛ at an IPS office.  It is unclear how this 
regulation fits in with the plans outlined in the Front Office Services prospectus. 
25. 3 (2) (c) Refers to a specific form.  This level of specificity seems inappropriate 
given the tendency for various versions of the forms to be issued (for example, in 
different languages). 
26. Schedule 1, part 1.  No details appear to be given about the biometrics being 
collected (other than the signature of the applicant). 
27. Part 1, 1 (p) speaks of ‚answers to questions for the purposes of paragraph 8(c) of 
Schedule 1 to the 2006 Act.  Ministers have frequently claimed that the Register 
will hold little more than is held on a typical passport, however, 8(c) concerns 
‚questions and answers to be used for identifying a person seeking to make such 
an application or to apply for or to make a modification of that entry‛.  
According to publicly available information about the biographical enrolment 
process this could be 20 minutes worth of questions that only the individual will 
know.  Moreover, recording the questions and answers on the NIR would appear 
to contradict written answer to question [219766] where Parliament was 
informed that ‚While precise arrangements for the retention of personal 
information gathered for the purposes of the interview have not been finalised, 
we will seek to build upon existing practice for interviews of first time passport 
applicants, which is usually to destroy the information shortly after the 
interview‛ *20 November 2008+. 
28. On the assumption that these security questions will vary according to the 
individual, it is unclear why this element does not also include the question to 
which the answer is given. 
29. Part 1, 1 (r) The periods of prohibition on travel suggests that, for some, the 
period of validity will not be 10 years. 
30. There is a real issue about the potentially discriminatory effects of such 
identification cards: when presented with a card for a UK national that is not 
valid for travel, the person examining the card may infer that the holder is 
subject to a banning order within the meaning for section 14 of the Football 
Spectators Act 1989(b); a travel restriction within the meaning of section 33 of the 
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001(a); or any other requirement imposed by a 
court to surrender that individual’s passport or ID card to the police or other 
authority, an individual who is within the category of persons not mentioned 
above and which has been notified to Parliament as one in respect of whom the 
Secretary of State will refuse passport facilities.  According to recent press 
reports3 might include ‘absent parents’. 
Verification of information on the Register 
31. 4 (c) The statement ‚any other appropriate remedy or relief‛ is rather vague. 
Prescribed information 
32. 3 (2) (a) It is unclear what is meant by the term ‚title of the card‛ in this context – 
unless it is intended to be the clear distinction between identity and identification 
cards. 
33. 3 (2) (l) Is the intention for any two fingers to be stored or, will normal practice be 
that two particular fingers are stored.  If the former, will the applicant have a 
choice as to which two fingers will have their fingerprints stored? 
Notification of changes 
34. 4 (2) (a) Given the need for high integrity for the Scheme, it is unclear how a high 
integrity system can be implemented that allows telephone applications for 
notifications to be made.  Moreover, given that part of the checking of telephone 
notifications will involve the answers to the security questions, this would 
suggest that far more than 100 civil servants will have access to personally 
sensitive data held on the Register. 
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 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7852640.stm “Absent parents may lose passports” 
35. 4 (2) (b) See above (24) for comments about appointments at IPS offices and the 
specification of particular forms. 
36. 6 (2) (c) It is unclear how ‚sufficient evidence to establish that the individual 
giving the notification is the individual to whom the ID card has been issued‛ 
will be implemented without addressing the security concerns outlined above 
(34). 
Civil penalties 
37. 2 (1) (b) It is unclear how the IPS would possibly have a ‚last known‛ facsimile 
number for the defaulter.  This information is not listed as being stored on the 
Register so how and where is it being stored and is it being kept securely. 
38. 2 (1) (c) Similar concerns arise in relation to the last known electronic mail 
address. 
39. The confidence in the delivery times for post, electronic mail and fax is to be 
commended. 
40. 4 seems to have a different time scale than 2 in that it refers to ‚the day on which 
the notice … was given to the defaulter‛ 
Provision of information with consent 
41. 5 (a) Is it intended that the explanation of the rights of an individual would be a 
formal set of words similar to a police caution? 
42. 5 (b) How does an individual know that the person is the person to whom the 
information would be provided? 
43. How are we to comment on 8 given that it is incomplete? 
44. 10 (b) Again, this element is incomplete. 
Code of practice on civil penalties 
45. 2.6 It is unclear what the distinction between collecting facial biometrics and 
being photographed is. 
46. 2.13 Does this really refer to surrendering a card or surrendering a card with 
travel rights for a replacement (to be charged at £30?) identification card without 
travel rights? 
47. 2.14 Are there plans for families to retain the card of a deceased relative (in the 
same way in which passports may be cancelled and then returned to the family)? 
48. 2.16 It is unclear what is meant by this statement.  Does this mean that someone 
could formally return their card to the Secretary of State and have their details 
removed from the NIR?  If so, in what circumstances could this formal returning 
take place?  If their details remain on the NIR, how does the IPS ensure that such 
individuals are not chased for civil penalties arising from failure to update their 
details. 
49. 4.4 refers to the date a letter was posted, 4.10 refers to the date a letter was 
received (two days after posting, according to the earlier regulations?), whilst 5.5 
refers to the actual date that the Secretary of State received the objection. 
50. 7.11 Presumably Wether is meant to be Whether? 
Prepared for the LSE Identity Project by Dr. Edgar A. Whitley e.a.whitley@lse.ac.uk 
The LSE Identity Project is more than willing to provide further details / clarification 
as required. 
